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Foreword by the Comptroller 
and Auditor General
The scale and nature of the COVID-19 pandemic 
and the government’s response are without 
precedent in recent history. The pandemic continues 
to be a major challenge for government, public 
sector bodies, as well as people across the UK and 
worldwide. Many people have died, and many lives 
have been adversely affected. The overall long-term 
impact and cost of the pandemic remains uncertain 
but will be substantial.
To date, the National Audit Office (NAO) has 
published 17 reports focusing on key parts of the 
response where there is scope for government to 
learn lessons from this experience about how it does 
and should operate. This report brings together our 
initial thoughts on this learning across six themes:
• risk management;
• transparency and public trust;
• data and evidence;
• coordination and delivery models;
• supporting and protecting people; and
• financial and workforce pressures.
The COVID-19 pandemic has stress-tested the 
government’s ability to deal with unforeseen events 
and potential shocks. Government has often acted 
at unprecedented speed to respond to a virus which 
has caused dramatic disruption to people’s lives, 
public service provision and society as a whole. 
Government had to continue to deliver essential 
public services, while reprioritising resources to 
deliver its response to the COVID-19 pandemic and 
supporting staff to work from home. In its response, 
government has had to streamline decision-making, 
work across departments and public bodies and 
use a range of delivery structures. Departments will 
need to reflect on the lessons learned to ensure that 
they capitalise on the benefits and opportunities 
these new ways of working have brought.
While the response to the pandemic has provided 
new learning from both what has worked well and 
what has not worked well, it has also laid bare 
existing fault lines within society, such as the risk 
of widening inequalities, and within public service 
delivery and government itself. The relationship 
between adult social care and the NHS, workforce 
shortages, the challenges posed by legacy data and 
IT systems, and the financial pressure felt by parts 
of the system all require long-term solutions.
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The challenges posed by the pandemic have 
highlighted the importance for government of 
adopting a systematic approach to preparing for 
high-impact events, evaluating its performance 
frequently, and acting quickly on learning 
points while adhering to required standards of 
transparency and accountability even in emergencies. 
This goes beyond meeting legal (or audit) 
requirements. It involves adhering to the standards 
that government has set for itself to maintain and 
strengthen public trust. Also, if government can 
build resilience into systems and delivery chains, 
and develop consistently robust horizon scanning, 
risk management and operational management 
capabilities across government, this will help it to cope 
better with future emergency responses while also 
improving business-as-usual activities.
This report provides our initial thoughts on the 
learning government can draw from its response to 
date, based on fieldwork which was mostly carried 
out in 2020. We aim to refine this thinking as we 
continue our work. Government will recognise 
and has already acted on some of these learning 
points, but given their importance, we reiterate 
them in this report. These issues, as well as more 
recent developments in the government’s pandemic 
response, will be further explored in our future work. 
And we will continue to draw out lessons from the 
government’s response to the pandemic to support 
its own evaluation of its performance and provide 




We have identified learning for government from its 
initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic across 
six themes. Our main messages across these six 
themes are set out below. 
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Risk management
Identifying the wide-ranging consequences of major emergencies and developing playbooks for 
the most significant impacts.
Being clear about risk appetite and risk tolerance as the basis for choosing which trade-offs 
should be made in emergencies.
Transparency 
and public trust Being clear and transparent about what government is trying to achieve, so that it can assess 
whether it is making a difference.
Meeting transparency requirements and providing clear documentation to support 
decision-making, with transparency being used as a control when other measures, such as 
competition, are not in place.
Producing clear and timely communications.
Supporting and 
protecting people Understanding to what extent the pandemic and government’s response have widened 
inequalities, and taking action where they have.
Providing appropriate support to front-line and other key workers to cope with the physical, 
mental and emotional demands of responding to the pandemic.
Coordination and
delivery models Ensuring that there is effective coordination and communication between government 
departments, central and local government, and private and public sector bodies.
Integrating health and social care and placing social care on an equal footing with the NHS.
Clarifying responsibilities for decision-making, implementation and governance, especially where 
delivery chains are complex and involve multiple actors.




Placing the NHS and local government on a sustainable footing, to improve their ability to 
respond to future emergencies.
Ensuring that existing systems can respond effectively and flexibly to emergencies, including 
provision for spare or additional capacity and redeploying staff where needed.
Considering which COVID-19-related spending commitments are likely to be retained 
for the long term, and what these additional spending commitments mean for long-term 
financial sustainability.
Data and evidence
Improving the accuracy, completeness and interoperability of key datasets and sharing them 
promptly across delivery chains.
Monitoring how programmes are operating, forecasting changes in demand as far as possible, 
and tackling issues arising from rapid implementation or changes in demand.
Gathering information from end-users and front-line staff more systematically to test the 
effectiveness of programmes and undertake corrective action when required.
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Introduction
1 In May 2020, the National Audit Office (NAO) 
published its first report on the government’s 
response to the pandemic, an Overview of the 
UK government’s response to the COVID-19 
pandemic. We noted that this report would help 
identify a risk-based series of descriptive and 
evaluative reports where government faced 
particular challenges and there was most to learn. 
Since then we have published a further 16 reports 
on the government’s response to the COVID-19 
pandemic, as well as regularly updating the 
estimated costs of the government’s response 
on our website.1
1 All of the reports are available on the dedicated COVID-19 section 
of our website at: www.nao.org.uk/about-us/covid-19/ and the cost 
tracker is available at: www.nao.org.uk/covid-19/cost-tracker/
2 The NAO’s reports on the government’s 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic cover many 
of the key programmes, such as the employment 
support schemes (the Coronavirus Job Retention 
Scheme and the Self-Employment Income Support 
Scheme), the Bounce Back Loan Scheme, NHS Test 
and Trace, and the supply of personal protective 
equipment, as well as more cross-cutting themes 
such as procurement during the pandemic and 
local government finance. A full list of our reports 
is provided in Appendix One and a list of the 
recommendations from these reports is provided 
in Appendix Two. By the end of April 2021, the 
Committee of Public Accounts had held sessions on 
16 out of the 17 reports we published. Appendix One 
also provides a list of the Committee’s COVID-19 
reports that had been published by 1 May 2021.
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3 By the end of March 2021, the estimated 
lifetime cost of measures announced as part 
of the government’s response was £372 billion 
(Figure 1 on page 10). The largest programmes, 
by estimated lifetime cost, are the Coronavirus Job 
Retention Scheme (£62 billion), NHS Test and Trace 
(£38 billion) and self-employment income support 
(£27 billion). Figure 2 on page 11 highlights the 
estimated lifetime costs by lead department, with the 
highest-spending departments being HM Revenue 
& Customs (£111 billion), the Department of Health 
& Social Care (£92 billion) and the Department for 
Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (£59 billion).
4 This report draws out learning from the reports 
that we have published to date, as well as other 
work we have published that covered the COVID-19 
pandemic, such as our good practice guides on 
fraud and error and operational delivery,2 our report 
on The adult social care market in England,3 and our 
Departmental Overview 2019-20: Department for 
Work & Pensions.4 It sets out this learning across 
six themes:
• risk management;
• transparency and public trust;
• data and evidence;
• coordination and delivery models;
• supporting and protecting people; and
• financial and workforce pressures.
We will continue to draw out learning from the 
government’s response to the pandemic from 
our future work.
2 National Audit Office, Good practice guidance: Fraud and error, 
March 2021, available at: www.nao.org.uk/report/good-practice-
guidance-fraud-and-error/ and National Audit Office, Improving 
operational delivery in government: A good practice guide for senior 
leaders, March 2021, available at: www.nao.org.uk/report/managing-
operations-senior-leaders-guide/
3 Comptroller and Auditor General, The adult social care market in 
England, Session 2019–2021, HC 1244, March 2021, available at: 
www.nao.org.uk/report/adult-social-care-markets/
4 National Audit Office, Departmental Overview 2019-20: 
Department for Work & Pensions, October 2020, available at:  
www.nao.org.uk/report/departmental-overview-2019-20-department-
for-work-pensions/





1 Figures are rounded to the nearest billion.
2 The area of each bubble is proportional to the estimated cost of the programme.
3 Business grant funding includes the Closed Business Lockdown Payment, the Innovate UK Business Support Package, the Retail, Hospitality 
and Leisure Grant Fund and the Small Business Grant Fund.
4 VAT measures include reduced VAT rates and VAT deferrals, except for the temporary VAT zero rate on personal protective equipment, which 
has been included in the personal protective equipment measures.
5 The programmes shown in this diagram account for £294 billion of the estimated lifetime costs of the government’s response. The remaining 
cost (£78 billion) relates to support for individuals, businesses, health and social care, and other public services and emergency responses.
Source: National Audit Offi ce COVID-19 cost tracker
Support for businesses
Support for health and social care
Support for individuals
Support for other public services and emergency responses
Figure 1
Breakdown of the estimated lifetime costs of the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic 
by programme, March 2021






































1 Figures are rounded to the nearest billion.
2 The area of each bubble is proportional to the estimated cost response by each lead department.
3 Spend on responses may not appear in a lead department’s accounts. For example, HM Treasury is the lead department for support 
to the devolved administrations (£26 billion). However, these items appear in the accounts of other government departments.
Source: National Audit Offi ce COVID-19 cost tracker
Figure 2
Breakdown of the estimated lifetime costs of the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic 
by lead department, March 2021
HM Revenue & Customs, the Department of Health & Social Care and the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy 
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Risk management
5 The government’s response to the COVID-19 
pandemic aims to protect people from exposure 
to the virus, ensure that those infected are cared 
for and mitigate damage to the economy. As well 
as ongoing risks, such as those related to exiting 
the EU, government has had to manage the risks 
generated by the pandemic and the risks associated 
with its own response measures. The pandemic and 
government’s response so far have highlighted the 
importance of carrying out robust risk planning and 
being clear about risk appetite and risk tolerance as 
the basis for choosing which trade-offs should be 
made in emergencies.
6 Government lacked a playbook for many 
aspects of its response. For example, pre-existing 
pandemic contingency planning did not include 
detailed plans for:
• identifying and supporting a large population 
advised to shield. The testing of plans and 
policies for the identification and shielding of 
clinically extremely vulnerable (CEV) people 
were not objectives of Exercise Cygnus, an 
exercise carried out in 2016 to assess the UK’s 
preparedness for an influenza pandemic;
Learning
Identifying the wide-ranging 
consequences of major 
emergencies and 
developing playbooks for the 
most significant impacts.
Being clear about 
risk appetite and risk 
tolerance as the basis for 
choosing which trade-offs should be 
made in emergencies.
Risk planning
Identifying the wide-ranging 
consequences of major emergencies 
and developing playbooks for the 
most significant impacts.
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• employment support schemes. Instead, 
HM Treasury and HM Revenue & Customs 
(HMRC) told us they drew on economic 
contingency planning designed for financial 
rescues, developed following the credit crisis; 
draft policy work on wage subsidy schemes; 
and lessons learned from other countries, such 
as Germany;
• financial support to local authorities, such as 
mechanisms for compensating authorities 
for a fall in income. The Ministry of Housing, 
Communities & Local Government (MHCLG) 
told us it had stress-tested its response to an 
economic shock as part of its contingency 
planning. However, the economic impact of 
the pandemic exceeded the economic shock 
assumed for this stress-testing; and
• managing mass disruption to schooling on the 
scale caused by COVID-19. The Department 
for Education’s emergency response function 
was designed to manage disruptions due to 
localised events such as floods.
No playbook can cover all the specific circumstances 
of every potential crisis. Nevertheless, more detailed 
planning for the key impacts of a pandemic and 
of other high-impact low-likelihood events can 
improve government’s ability to respond to future 
emergencies. It may also bring other benefits, 
such as creating new relationships and improving 
understanding between organisations.
7 Once the scale of the COVID-19 outbreak in 
the UK became apparent, the government made 
several rapid, large-scale spending decisions and 
implemented some measures at pace. For example, 
the food box deliveries for CEV people were up and 
running within days of being announced. In a matter 
of weeks, personal protective equipment (PPE) and 
ventilator procurement were set up, employment 
support and business loan schemes were up and 
running, and the campaigns to house rough sleepers 
and deliver school meal vouchers were designed 
and implemented. Government was also quick 
to announce unringfenced funding (£3.2 billion 
between March 2020 and April 2020) to help local 
authorities address the financial pressures caused 
by the pandemic.






Estimated percentage of loans 
from the Bounce Back Loans 
Scheme that may not be repaid
HM Revenue & Customs’ 
planning assumption for the 
percentage of payments from 
the Coronavirus Job Retention 
Scheme that were due to 
fraud and error
Risk appetite and trade-offs from 
acting quickly
Being clear about risk appetite 
and risk tolerance as the basis for 
choosing which trade-offs should 
be made in emergencies.
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8 To enable speed of action, government relaxed 
controls and streamlined spending approvals, 
recognising that this would lead to an increased risk 
of fraud and error:
• In designing employment support schemes, 
HMRC acknowledged that it would need to 
make certain trade-offs between its normal 
approach of preventing as much fraud and 
error as possible and ensuring grants reached 
claimants quickly. HMRC drew up longlists 
of potential controls for both schemes. 
In total it identified 42 potential controls 
for the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme 
(CJRS), of which 24 were implemented by the 
go-live date and 57 for the Self-Employment 
Income Support Scheme (SEISS), of which 
38 were delivered by the end of April 2020. 
HMRC’s planning assumptions were that 
between 5% and 10% of payments from 
the CJRS and between 1% and 2% of 
payments from the SEISS were due to fraud 
and error. This amounts to between £2 billion 
and £3.9 billion for the CJRS and between 
£130 million and £270 million for the SEISS.
• The number of Universal Credit claimants 
roughly doubled in 2020 and the Department 
for Work & Pensions (DWP) suspended some 
controls such as face-to-face appointments 
to support vulnerable people during lockdown 
and manage demand. Of Universal Credit 
payments, £1.7 billion (9.4%) were overpaid in 
2019-20 before COVID-19. DWP accepts that 
the increased caseload and easements made 
to the process of applying for benefits will lead 
to a further increase in fraud and error levels.
• The Department for Business, Energy & 
Industrial Strategy (BEIS), in conjunction with 
the British Business Bank (the Bank), has 
estimated that between 35% and 60% of 
loans from the Bounce Back Loans Scheme 
may not be repaid, and this represents both 
credit and fraud risks. In March 2021, the 
estimated value of these loans was between 
£16 billion and £27 billion based on loans 
to date. BEIS and the Bank are working on 
estimating what proportion is due to fraud.
• By January 2021, the Department of Health & 
Social Care (DHSC) had spent £10.2 billion on 
PPE, with an estimated lifetime cost of around 
£15.2 billion. The Government Counter Fraud 
Function has assessed a high risk of fraud 
in the procurement of PPE. DHSC has yet to 
estimate the size of this potential fraud.
While some controls were relaxed, the overall 
framework set out in Managing Public Money has 
remained in place throughout the pandemic as the 
basis on which accounting officers should make 
decisions to ensure that public funds are used in 
the public interest.
9 Government accepted other trade-offs from 
acting quickly, such as paying higher prices for 
goods than it would have paid before the pandemic. 
For example, DHSC experienced increasing global 
competition to buy ventilators and made purchases 
primarily on the offer’s credibility, not price. It also 
paid high prices for PPE because of the global surge 
in demand for these goods and export restrictions in 
some countries.
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10 Government focused on getting some 
programmes up and running quickly, recognising 
that they may need to be amended as they went. 
For instance, due to limitations in the datasets 
available, initially some 870,000 CEV people were 
identified centrally as eligible for support to help 
them shield. A further 420,000 were identified 
as eligible by 12 April 2020 and another 900,000 
people by 7 May 2020. When the Bounce Back 
Loan Scheme was launched on 4 May 2020 
(seven days after it was announced), the Bank 
had a reporting portal for lenders, but this 
required manual data entry for each application. 
An automatic reporting functionality was introduced 
in mid-June 2020. Governance arrangements of 
some programmes were also redesigned during 
the response (for example, see paragraph 30).
11 Some departments made good use of 
ministerial directions to proceed with programmes 
where they lacked assurance over value for money. 
Due to the speed at which programmes were being 
implemented, accounting officers could not gain 
assurance over the value for money of several 
COVID-19 response measures. These included the 
Bounce Back Loan Scheme, the Local Authority 
Discretionary Grants Fund and the Retail, Hospitality 
and Leisure Business Grants Fund. As prescribed by 
Managing Public Money, some accounting officers 
obtained directions from ministers to proceed with 
these programmes. In 2020, 19 ministerial directions 
were published, compared with an average of five 
per year between 2017 and 2019 (Figure 3).5
5 Ministerial directions are formal instructions from ministers telling 
their department to proceed with a spending proposal, despite an 
objection from their permanent secretary. Permanent secretaries, who 
are directly accountable to Parliament for how the department spends 
its money, have a duty to seek a ministerial direction if they think a 
spending proposal breaches any of the following criteria: regularity 
(if the proposal is beyond the department’s legal powers, or agreed 
spending budgets); propriety (if it does not meet “high standards of 
public conduct”, such as appropriate governance or parliamentary 
expectations); value for money (if something else, or doing nothing, 
would be cheaper and better); and feasibility (if there is doubt about 
the proposal being “implemented accurately, sustainably or to the 
intended timetable”).
Notes
1 Six ministerial directions were published in 2019 (four on
value-for-money grounds).
2 The total does not include the Prime Minister’s Personal Minute
issued to the Cabinet Offi ce Permanent Secretary on 28 June 2020
to authorise an exit payment.
3 The ministerial directions have been categorised by the National Audit 
Offi ce. The categorisation has not been agreed with HM Treasury.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of GOV.UK data
Figure 3
Ministerial directions published in 2020
COVID-19-related, 
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Transparency and public trust
12 In responding to a new virus and global 
pandemic, government faced exceptionally 
challenging circumstances. The public sector 
has needed to respond in unprecedented ways 
while seeking to maintain and build public trust. 
Central to this is setting clear objectives, being 
transparent about what actions were taken and 
why, the trade-offs being made, and providing clear, 
consistent and timely communications.
13 Detailed objectives help to ensure that 
the success of programmes can be measured. 
For example, HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) 
agreed clear principles for its employment support 
schemes, including that the claim process should 
be simple and the grant calculation straightforward. 
Although the Bounce Back Loans Scheme achieved 
its initial objective of quickly supporting small 
businesses, a lack of more detailed scheme-specific 
objectives will make it difficult to measure its 
ultimate success.
Learning
Being clear and transparent 
about what government is 
trying to achieve, so that 
it can assess whether it is making 
a difference.
Meeting transparency 
requirements and providing 
clear documentation to 
support decision-making, 
with transparency being used as a 
control when other measures, such 
as competition, are not in place.
Producing clear and 
timely communications.
Objectives
Being clear and transparent about 
what government is trying to achieve, 
so that it can assess whether it is 
making a difference.
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14 Transparency, including a clear audit trail to 
support key decisions, is a vital control to ensure 
accountability, especially when government is having 
to act at pace and other controls (for example, 
competitive tendering) are not in place. On the 
ventilator programmes, we found sufficient record 
of the programmes’ rationale, the key spending 
decisions taken, and the information departments 
had to base those on. However, in the procurement of 
personal protective equipment (PPE) and other goods 
and services using emergency direct awards during 
the pandemic, we and the Government Internal 
Audit Agency found that there was not always a 
clear audit trail to support key decisions, such as 
why some suppliers which had low due diligence 
ratings were awarded contracts. HMRC initially 
ruled out publishing the details of every company 
claiming furlough payments, which might have 
alerted some employees that their employer was 
acting fraudulently.
15 We found that many of the contracts awarded 
during the pandemic had not been published 
on time. Of the 1,644 contracts awarded across 
government up to the end of July 2020 with a 
contract value above £25,000, 75% were not 
published on Contracts Finder within the 90-day 
target and 55% had not had their details published 
by 10 November 2020. The Cabinet Office and 
DHSC acknowledged the backlog of contract details 
awaiting publication and noted that resources 
were now being devoted to this, having earlier 
been prioritised on ensuring procurements were 
processed so that goods and services could be 
made available for the pandemic response.
Evidence to support decision-making
Meeting transparency requirements 
and providing clear documentation 
to support decision-making, with 
transparency being used as a control 
when other measures, such as 
competition, are not in place.
Key facts from our published work
148
0.07%
New guidance documents and 
updates to existing material 
published by the Department 
for Education between 
16 March and 1 May 2020
Spend on communication as 
a percentage of government’s 
expected total investment in 
purchasing and manufacturing 
COVID-19 vaccines for 
the UK, deploying them in 
England and supporting global 
efforts to fi nd vaccines as at 
8 December 2020 (£8 million 
out of £11,702 million)
25%
Percentage of contracts 
with a value over £25,000 
awarded in response to the 
pandemic up to 31 July 2020 
where the contract awards 
were published within the 
90-day target
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16 Effective communication and public 
engagement are crucial to ensuring that COVID-19 
response programmes succeed. Effective 
communication helps achieve policy objectives 
and strengthens public trust by helping the public 
understand what the government is doing, why, 
and what it means for them and their communities.
• In our work, we found examples of effective, 
clear and consistent communications. 
For instance, HMRC developed a range of 
communication and engagement plans for 
its employment support schemes. It notified 
self-assessment taxpayers that they may have 
been eligible for the Self-Employment Income 
Support Scheme, reached out to some of the 
largest employers to check if they intended 
to apply for the Coronavirus Job Retention 
Scheme, and worked with ethnic minority 
and faith-based organisations to publicise 
the schemes.
• Despite government advertising and 
communications relating to NHS Test and 
Trace, reported levels of non-compliance with 
self-isolation requirements were high.
• DHSC has acknowledged variation in the 
public’s perception of COVID-19 vaccines, 
with some groups more hesitant than others. 
Designing effective targeted communications 
will be important if the optimum level of 
vaccine take-up is to be achieved.
17 Communications from government were not 
always clear and timely. For example:
• guidance on PPE (issued jointly by DHSC, 
Public Health England and NHS England & 
NHS Improvement) changed 30 times up to 
31 July 2020, including material and relatively 
minor changes. While frequent updates were 
needed to reflect an increased understanding 
of a new virus and a rapidly changing policy 
position, social care representatives raised 
concerns about the guidance, including that the 
frequency of changes made it confusing; and
• the Department for Education calculated 
that, between 16 March and 1 May 2020, it 
published 148 new guidance documents and 
updates to existing material. Stakeholders told 
us that guidance was often published at the 
end of the week or late in the evening, putting 
schools under pressure, especially when 
guidance was for immediate implementation. 
When the guidance was updated, schools were 
not always clear what changes had been made.
Communications and public engagement
Producing clear and 
timely communications.
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Data and evidence
18 The insight generated through reliable data 
is crucial to the way government delivers services 
for citizens, improves its systems and processes, 
and makes decisions. Our work has repeatedly 
emphasised the importance of evidence-based 
decision-making at all levels of government 
activity and the problems that arise when data are 
inadequate. The pandemic has again highlighted 
the role of high-quality data in enabling effective 
service delivery, monitoring and improvement. 
It has generated new datasets and data collection 
processes that can be used to inform future 
service delivery.
19 Timely sharing of data has been vital for 
providing front-line services and managing the 
response at the national level. For instance, while 
the Department of Health & Social Care (DHSC) and 
the Cabinet Office ran their programmes to increase 
the number of ventilators separately, they worked 
toward the same overall targets and exchanged 
progress data daily. The Ministry of Housing, 
Communities & Local Government (MHCLG) 
introduced a monthly survey of cost pressures and 
income losses experienced by local authorities 
due to the pandemic. Despite some data quality 
issues, it provided an important dataset that several 
departments have used to shape their responses.
Learning
Improving the accuracy, 
completeness and 
interoperability of key 
datasets and sharing them promptly 
across delivery chains.
Monitoring how programmes 
are operating, forecasting 
changes in demand as far as 
possible, and tackling issues arising 
from rapid implementation or changes 
in demand.
Gathering information from 
end-users and front-line 
staff more systematically 
to test the effectiveness of 
programmes and undertake corrective 
action when required.
Accuracy, completeness and sharing 
of data
Improving the accuracy, 
completeness and interoperability 
of key datasets and sharing them 
promptly across delivery chains.
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20 However, timely sharing of data has not always 
occurred, and legacy IT issues remain challenging:
• NHS Test and Trace (NHST&T) publishes a 
large volume of data every week which helps 
understand the progress of COVID-19 and 
tracing performance (Figure 4). However, local 
authorities did not initially have access to all 
the NHST&T data they needed to deliver their 
local pandemic response.
• By 22 March, when shielding was 
announced, 870,000 people had been 
identified centrally as clinically extremely 
vulnerable (CEV). It took three weeks to identify 
and communicate with a further 420,000 CEV 
people. This was largely down to the challenge 
of extracting usable data from different NHS 
and GP IT systems.
Key facts from our published work
375,000
815,000
Number of clinically 
extremely vulnerable 
people who were sent 
letters advising them to 
shield but did not receive a 
follow-up call due to missing 
or inaccurate telephone 
numbers provided in 
NHS patient records
Number of clinically extremely 
vulnerable people whose 
details were passed to local 
authorities to check if these 
people needed help
95%
Proportion of Self-Employment 
Income Support Scheme 
claimants who were satisfi ed 
or very satisfi ed with their 
experience up to August 2020
Note
1 Data relate to the period from 28 May 2020 to 4 November 2020.
Source: Comptroller and Auditor General, The government’s approach 
to test and trace in England – interim report
Figure 4
Estimated number of people in England 
infected with COVID-19, receiving positive tests, 
transferred to the tracing service and reached 
by NHS Test and Trace
People with COVID-19 
(estimated)
Tested positive by 
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21 In responding to the pandemic, government 
has expanded the range of data that it can use for 
decision-making. For example, MHCLG now has 
data on the potential scale of the population in 
England which either sleeps rough or is at risk of 
doing so. At the start of the outbreak, there was no 
systematic national process to collect a wide range 
of information from care providers, other than on 
vacant beds (for instance, on levels of personal 
protective equipment and workforce absences). 
For care homes, a tool commissioned by NHS 
England & NHS Improvement (NHSE&I) in 2019 
was adapted and expanded, and data have been 
collated since early April 2020. Government has 
also taken steps to improve the quality of its data. 
For example, NHST&T received advice from the 
Office for National Statistics and a rapid review by 
the UK Statistics Authority.
22 Limitations in the accuracy and completeness 
of the data used and collected by government 
have affected some pandemic response measures. 
For example, NHSE&I sent letters to all those advised 
to shield. However, missing or inaccurate telephone 
numbers within NHS patient records meant that the 
shielding programme could not follow up these letters 
with calls to some 375,000 CEV people. While it was 
known to all parties that a proportion of telephone 
numbers in NHS records were missing or inaccurate, 
the shielding programme agreed to use telephone 
numbers from NHS records as a starting point to 
follow up hard-copy letters. The Government Digital 
Service shared with local authorities the contact 
details of people that could not be reached, so local 
authorities could check if these people needed help. 
Local authorities also struggled with inaccurate 
contact information.
23 Government has been able to take remedial 
action to address some issues arising from rapid 
implementation, and improve performance. 
For example, the Department for Education and its 
contractor acted quickly to solve initial problems 
experienced by schools and families on its free 
school meal voucher scheme. This resulted in 
improved performance. In terms of vaccines, 
NHSE&I has had to continually review and adapt its 
deployment plans to ensure it could respond to the 
latest information about which vaccines had been 
approved, which groups in society needed to be 
vaccinated, how many doses of vaccines would be 
available, and when and how those vaccines needed 
to be deployed. The Department for Digital, Culture, 
Media & Sport adjusted elements of its response to 
take account of the pandemic’s progression and the 
impact it has had on the arts and culture sector.
Monitoring performance, flexing 
government’s response and 
forecasting demand
Monitoring how programmes are 
operating, forecasting changes 
in demand as far as possible, and 
tackling issues arising from rapid 
implementation or changes in demand.
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24 Data limitations affected the government’s 
ability to assess the effectiveness and value for 
money of some measures, which made it harder 
to adapt its response and manage the risks of 
rapid implementation:
• MHCLG attempted to collect data from local 
authorities on basic care provision for CEV 
people but was unable to identify a workable 
solution acceptable to local authorities by 
the end of July 2020, when the programme 
ended. Local authorities reported that bringing 
together data on basic support provided by a 
mix of local authority and voluntary groups was 
too burdensome. In the absence of these data, 
MHCLG accepted that it had some assurance 
that local authorities were meeting basic needs 
given that local authorities had provided similar 
support for a number of years. Its engagement 
with local authorities also gave it some 
assurance that they were meeting basic needs. 
• While HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) monitored 
the take-up rate of the Self-Employment Income 
Support Scheme among different age and 
gender profiles, it does not have data to 
monitor take-up rates among different ethnic 
groups, as these data are not necessary for 
the administration of taxes.
25 Government’s ability to forecast changes 
in demand, and to update programmes based on 
updated demand, has been variable:
• During March 2020, in response to changes 
in planning assumptions approved by the 
Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies, 
NHSE&I revised down its estimate of the 
peak number of ventilator beds that could be 
needed. In April, based on the lower demand, 
ministers adopted new targets for the ventilator 
programme to provide additional resilience 
in the system and prepare for a potential 
second wave.
• The staff utilisation rate for contact tracers 
fell to under 1% in August 2020. NHST&T 
was initially unable to reduce staffing levels 
to meet its target utilisation rate of 50% due 
to lack of flexibility in contracts. The utilisation 
rate then rose, ranging between 10% and 
56% in October 2020.
• NHST&T did not predict the scale of 
increased demand for COVID-19 testing 
in September 2020, when schools and 
universities reopened, and could not satisfy the 
demand for tests until mid-September 2020.
26 Gathering feedback from end-users and 
front-line staff is essential for monitoring the 
effectiveness of interventions and improving 
existing processes. For example, HMRC carried out 
surveys of employers, employees and self-employed 
people who accessed the employment support 
schemes. The high satisfaction scores recorded 
gave HMRC confidence that it was delivering a good 
customer experience to claimants. On the other 
hand, while NHS provider organisations told us they 
were always able to get the PPE needed in time, this 
was not the experience reported by some front-
line workers, particularly Black, Asian and minority 
ethnic staff. Public Health England’s stakeholder 
engagement to better understand the impact of 
COVID-19 on Black, Asian and minority ethnic 
groups reported deep concerns about the support 
that these workers in health and care settings 
received, stating that “it was recognised that a lot 
has been done since the start of the pandemic 
to improve access to PPE and mitigate risk, but 
concerns were expressed that these safeguards 
were not applied equally across ethnic groups”.
Validating interventions by gathering 
end-user feedback
Gathering information from 
end-users and front-line staff 
more systematically to test the 
effectiveness of programmes 
and undertake corrective action 
when required.
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Coordination and delivery models
27 The pandemic response has involved 
extensive coordination between departments, 
arm’s-length bodies, local and national government, 
and public-private collaboration. Delivery chains 
have often been complex and involved multiple 
actors. Against this backdrop, setting out effective 
governance arrangements, with clear responsibilities 
and accountabilities, is vital to delivering outcomes.
28 The pandemic response involved examples 
of effective cross-government and public-private 
sector collaboration:
• Policy and operational staff at HM Revenue 
& Customs (HMRC) and HM Treasury (HMT) 
worked closely to develop the employment 
support schemes, with HMT leading on policy 
design and HMRC leading on administrative 
design, implementation and administration.
• The Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local 
Government’s (MHCLG’s) initial engagement 
with local authorities on supporting clinically 
extremely vulnerable people to shield was 
directive rather than consultative. It recognised 
that it needed to improve engagement with 
local authorities and moved to a collaborative 
approach. The small number of local authorities 
we spoke to criticised government’s engagement 
with them in the first few weeks of the initiative, 
with some noting that engagement improved 
over summer.
Learning
Ensuring that there is 
effective coordination and 
communication between 
government departments, central 





governance, especially where 
delivery chains are complex 
and involve multiple actors.
Integrating health and social 
care and placing social care 
on an equal footing with 
the NHS.
Balancing the relative merits 
of central, universal offers 
of support against targeted 
local support.
Cross-government coordination and 
public-private collaboration
Ensuring that there is effective 
coordination and communication 
between government departments, 
central and local government, and 
private and public sector bodies.
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• The Cabinet Office worked with industry to 
develop new, or modify existing, ventilator or 
anaesthesia machine designs to meet standards 
that the Medicines and Healthcare products 
Regulatory Agency developed for rapidly 
manufactured ventilators, and to increase 
manufacturing capacity to build each design at 
a much greater scale than usual. This involved 
securing new factory capacity for each design, 
managing global supply chains and ensuring 
regulatory approvals were in place.
• The purchase, manufacturing and deployment of 
vaccines involves extensive cross-government 
and public-private collaboration (Figure 5).
Key facts from our published work
17
Lead departments involved 
in the COVID-19 response 
which had an estimated 
lifetime response cost of 
more than £1 million, as of 
end of March 2021
More than 7
4.7m
Organisations involved in 
purchasing, manufacturing 
and deploying vaccines 
in England
Number of food boxes delivered 
to clinically extremely vulnerable 
people between 27 March and 
1 August 2020 through private 
sector contracts
Figure 5
Organisations involved in purchasing, 
manufacturing and deploying vaccines in England
Access to vaccines and manufacturing capability
Prime Minister • Overall direction and strategy
Vaccine 
Taskforce
• Identifying vaccines, securing access
• Developing manufacturing capacity















• Approving vaccines for use
NHS England 
& Improvement




• Storing and distributing vaccines
• Supplying other goods 
(for example, syringes)
Source: Comptroller and Auditor General, Investigation into preparations 
for potential COVID-19 vaccines
Responsibilities for decision-making, 
implementation and governance
Clarifying responsibilities for 
decision-making, implementation 
and governance, especially where 
delivery chains are complex 
and involve multiple actors.
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29 Effective governance and clear responsibilities 
and accountabilities are important for an effective 
rapid response in an emergency. For example, the 
Department for Work & Pension’s (DWP’s) clear 
prioritisation of paying benefits and suspension 
of other activities enabled it to process an 
unprecedented number of claims during the first 
lockdown. This was supported by clear governance 
within DWP. On the other hand, we found that several 
organisations had responsibility for approving, 
maintaining and distributing personal protective 
equipment (PPE) from the pandemic influenza 
stockpile. There were issues with warehousing, 
logistics and quality of stock.
30 Government has modified the 
governance arrangements of key pandemic 
response programmes:
• NHS Test and Trace (NHST&T) initially had an 
unusual organisational relationship with the 
Department of Health & Social Care (DHSC). 
Although NHST&T was subject to DHSC’s 
financial, information and staffing controls, its 
head, the executive chair, did not report to the 
DHSC’s ministers or permanent secretary, but 
rather to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet 
Secretary. Since NHST&T is embedded within 
DHSC, these dual reporting lines brought risks 
of unclear accountability. We did not undertake 
a systematic review to determine if these risks 
had materialised and had seen no evidence 
that they had.
• In September 2020, a faster process 
for approving vaccines expenditure was 
introduced by government and the governance 
for vaccines activities was revised. DHSC 
appointed a single senior responsible officer 
to oversee deployment to create a unified 
programme to reduce duplication, streamline 
responsibilities, facilitate cross-departmental 
working, and increase transparency 
and accountability.
31 Issues predating the pandemic made 
responding to the crisis more difficult in some areas. 
The relationship between adult social care and the 
NHS has been challenging for decades. We have 
reported on successive efforts to integrate the 
two sectors: there have been 12 government white 
papers, green papers and consultations, and five 
independent reviews on integration over the past 
20 years. Certain aspects of the initial pandemic 
response reflected a greater emphasis on health 
than on social care. For example, national bodies 
initially provided more PPE support to hospitals 
than to social care. NHS trusts received 80% of 
their estimated PPE requirement through national 
schemes between 20 March 2020 and 31 July 
2020, whereas social care providers received 
10% of their estimated requirement (based on 
the information available at the time).6 DHSC told 
us that it took different approaches to providing 
PPE to social care and trusts during the pandemic. 
Social care providers, which are mostly private- or 
voluntary-sector organisations, either obtained PPE 
from wholesalers (as they did prior to the pandemic) 
or from local resilience forums and DHSC’s helpline, 
which it set up to respond to emergency requests, 
whereas trusts received PPE directly from the 
cross-government PPE team set up by DHSC.
6 Distributions to trusts include a very small volume of PPE delivered to 
other healthcare settings.
The relation between health and 
social care
Integrating health and social care and 
placing social care on an equal footing 
with the NHS.
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32 In responding to the pandemic, DHSC 
has increased its focus on social care. DHSC 
outlined how, under the current Care Act 2014, 
its oversight of the social care market had been 
limited. Stakeholders reported DHSC’s limited 
engagement with, and understanding of, the sector 
going into the pandemic. Prior to COVID-19 there 
was no process in place to collect a wide range 
of data from providers regularly. In response to 
COVID-19, DHSC has increased the data it obtains 
on care providers and it intends to legislate for 
new powers to collect further data. As part of its 
adult social care winter plan, DHSC carried out a 
review of risks to local care markets and service 
continuity issues, offering targeted support. It also 
re-established a director-general post with sole 
responsibility for social care, increased its policy 
team threefold and set up specific teams to provide 
support and challenge to local government on the 
COVID-19 response.
33 Pandemic response measures have employed 
a combination of universal offers and targeted 
delivery models. For instance:
• the Everyone In campaign was rolled out across 
England to provide accommodation for all rough 
sleepers. For the winter of 2020, the campaign 
was supplemented with a targeted programme 
focused on the areas with large numbers of 
rough sleepers;
• in May 2020, the government launched NHST&T, 
bringing together a national programme 
for testing and tracing. By July 2020, local 
authorities had started to set up their own 
locally run contact tracing schemes to cover 
the minority of cases that the national service 
could not reach, working in conjunction with 
NHST&T. In August, NHST&T reduced the 
number of national-level contact tracers and 
designated a proportion of its specialist tracing 
staff to work exclusively to facilitate those local 
authorities that had their own scheme. By the 
end of October, 40% (60) of local authorities 
had a scheme in place, with a further 46% (69) 
planning to set one up; and
• while the Culture Recovery Fund accepted 
applications from across England, one of its 
goals was to help ‘level up’ cultural resources 
for deprived communities. This was reflected 
in the funding criteria. An analysis by the 
Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport 
found that the 10% of local authorities most 
in need of levelling up were more successful in 
their grant applications than those least in need.
34 Universal offers of support can be developed 
at speed but may not always be as cost-effective 
as targeted offers. A government review of the 
shielding programme concluded that, due to 
the speed and context in which the programme 
was developed, it was largely offered universally, 
resulting in poor targeting and inefficient use of 
funds. The review noted that, should shielding 
be needed again, adopting a local support model 
could improve flexibility and, potentially, be more 
cost-effective.
Central and local delivery models
Balancing the relative merits of central, 
universal offers of support against 
targeted local support.
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Supporting and protecting people
35 The COVID-19 pandemic has required 
government to work at pace and scale to save lives, 
keep people out of hospitals and support those 
not working or in school. Due to the speed of the 
response required, government did not always fully 
consider the implications of design decisions on 
different groups of individuals. In future, there will 
be opportunities for government to reflect on how 
its actions may have affected inequalities, and what 
ongoing assistance may need to be provided to 
the front-line and other key workers, on whom the 
pandemic placed significant physical, mental and 
emotional demands.
36 The pandemic has disproportionately impacted 
specific groups of people. For example:
• the virus is disproportionately deadly for 
certain groups, particularly the elderly, men, 
some ethnic groups, and those with some 
pre-existing medical conditions; and
Learning
Understanding to what 
extent the pandemic and 
government’s response 
have widened inequalities, and taking 
action where they have.
Providing appropriate 
support to front-line and 
other key workers to cope 
with the physical, mental and 
emotional demands of responding 
to the pandemic.
The pandemic’s impact on 
different groups and the risk 
of widening inequalities
Understanding to what extent the 
pandemic and government’s response 
have widened inequalities, and taking 
action where they have.
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• disrupted schooling is likely to have 
longer-term adverse effects on children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds in particular. 
The Education Endowment Foundation has 
projected that school closures in the 2019/20 
academic year might widen the attainment 
gap between disadvantaged children and 
their peers by between 11% and 75%, with 
a median estimate of 36%, likely reversing 
progress made to narrow the gap since 
2011. Representative groups told us that 
remote learning had been especially difficult 
for children with special educational needs 
and disabilities.
37 Employment support programmes helped 
many people, but some people were not eligible. 
The schemes have been largely successful in 
protecting jobs through the first lockdown period, 
with at least 12.2 million people benefitting from 
support. As many as 2.9 million people were not 
eligible for the schemes, partly as a result of policy 
decisions about how to target the schemes and partly 
because of constraints in the tax system to help 
guard it against fraud (Figure 6). For example, Self-
Employment Income Support Scheme claims from 
around 200,000 people who became self-employed 
after the 2018-19 tax year were not allowed 
because HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) validated 
applications by using 2018-19 self-assessment 
records. Had lockdown occurred later in 2019-20, the 
number of self-employed people excluded could have 
been greater. More frequent filing of tax return data 
is not currently supported by HMRC’s systems. It is 
due to be in place from April 2023, as part of HMRC’s 
Making Tax Digital programme.




Minimum number of 
people who benefi ted 
from employment 
support schemes up 
to September 2020
Number of people brought into 
accommodation in response 
to the pandemic as at end of 
November 2020
Median estimate of the possible 
growth in the attainment gap 
between disadvantaged 
children and their peers from 
March to September 2020
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38 Some departments are undertaking work to 
understand the take-up of support schemes by 
different groups better. For example, HMRC has 
carried out equality impact assessments for its 
employment support schemes, as well as an analysis 
of the ethnic background of self-employed workers 
to inform its communication strategy. HMRC is 
planning further survey work to understand the 
take-up and customer experience of the schemes 
across different claimant groups.
39 The pandemic placed great stress on 
some health and social care workers already 
under pressure before the COVID-19 outbreak. 
For example:
• in May 2020, some 45% of doctors (3,936 out 
of 8,685) responding to a survey by the 
British Medical Association reported suffering 
from depression, anxiety, stress, burnout, 
emotional distress or other mental health 
conditions relating to or made worse by their 
work. Some registered managers in social 
care reported the mental health of workers 
was under massive strain, with individuals 
particularly concerned about getting ill and 
unknowingly passing the virus on; and
• some care workers, doctors and nurses 
considered that they were not adequately 
protected during the height of the pandemic’s 
first wave and many social care providers 
highlighted being extremely close to running 
out of personal protective equipment. 
This created uncertainty, anxiety and stress.
Given the stress that staff were experiencing before 
the pandemic, and the additional pressures caused 
by COVID-19, it is likely that the after-effects of 
responding to the pandemic will be substantial 
and, for some people, long-lasting. In June 2020, 
NHS England & NHS Improvement told us it would 
establish outreach, screening and intervention via 
resilience hubs and is working to support the mental 
health of all key workers delivering health and care.
Figure 6
People supported and ineligible for the 











1 Figures are for the period from when each scheme was made 
available, that is, 20 April 2020 for the Coronavirus Job Retention 
Scheme (CJRS) and 13 May for the Self-Employment Income Support 
Scheme (SEISS) to 20 September 2020.
2 The individuals ineligible for the CJRS were short-term or freelance 
workers moving within jobs and limited company directors paid 
through dividends instead of salary (who could claim for earnings 
registered with the Pay-As-You-Earn scheme and apply for bounce 
back loans).
3 Of the 1.8 million individuals ineligible for the SEISS, 1.6 million 
were ineligible due to decisions on how to target the scheme 
(for example, those with non-trading income higher than their 
trading profi ts) and 0.2 million were individuals newly self-employed 
in 2019-20. The latter are ineligible for the fourth SEISS grant, which 
covers the period from February to April 2021.
Source: Comptroller and Auditor General, Implementing employment 
support schemes in response to the COVID-19 pandemic
People supported
People ineligible
Support for front-line and key workers
Providing appropriate support to 
front-line and other key workers to 
cope with the physical, mental and 
emotional demands of responding 
to the pandemic.
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Financial and workforce pressures
40 Financial and workforce pressures 
compounded government’s challenges in responding 
to the pandemic. Government responded by 
increasing the workforce and redeploying staff to 
key areas. Government can strengthen its ability 
to respond to future emergencies by ensuring 
that the NHS and local government are financially 
sustainable, building an appropriate level of 
spare capacity in key services, and considering 
the long-term impact of pandemic-related 
spending commitments.
41 The NHS and local government now face two 
main challenges: to maintain readiness and build 
resilience to respond to emergencies, such as 
COVID-19, and to ensure that other services are 
sustainable. Since 2010-11, both the NHS and local 
government have been under financial pressure. 
For example:
• local authorities’ spending power (made up of 
government grants, locally retained business 
rates and council tax) fell by 28.7%, in real 
terms, between 2010-11 and 2019-20;
• the public health grant to local authorities 
decreased by £0.5 billion, in real terms, 
between 2015-16 and 2018-19; and
• additional funding for health and social care 
has at times been used to address immediate 
needs rather than to increase the long-term 
sustainability of these services.
Learning
Placing the NHS and local 
government on a sustainable 
footing, to improve their ability 
to respond to future emergencies.
Ensuring that existing 
systems can respond 
effectively and flexibly to 
emergencies, including provision 
for spare or additional capacity and 
redeploying staff where needed.
Considering which 
COVID-19-related spending 
commitments are likely to 
be retained for the long term, and 
what these additional spending 
commitments mean for long-term 
financial sustainability.
Financial pressures
Placing the NHS and local 
government on a sustainable footing, 
to improve their ability to respond to 
future emergencies.
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42 Local authorities’ finances have been 
scarred by the pandemic and will not bounce 
back quickly once the pandemic ends. As of early 
December 2020, three-quarters of local authorities 
have a reported funding gap in 2020-21 between 
their forecast pressures and estimated government 
support, and 94% of chief finance officers from 
single tier and county councils we surveyed expected 
to make cuts in service budgets in 2021-22.
43 Existing workforce issues added to the 
challenges of responding to the pandemic. 
Our previous reports had highlighted staffing 
shortages in both the health and social care 
sectors. For example, between October 2019 and 
December 2019, NHS trusts reported vacancy 
rates of 11% for nursing and 7% for medical staff. 
In a survey of the adult social care sector in late 
March 2020, 34% of providers responded that 
they urgently needed more staff.7
44 Staff constraints also limited the types of 
controls that HM Revenue & Customs could 
implement over furlough fraud (employers claiming 
money while their furloughed employees continue 
to work). Contacting furloughed employees 
retrospectively to check if they were working was 
ruled out as it would have required resources to be 
diverted away from helping employers make claims.
7 Skills for Care’s analysis of Care Management Matters COVID-19 
Survey looked at the impact of COVID-19 on the adult social care 
workforce. The survey was completed on 31 March 2020 by 211 adult 
social care providers.




Number of additional staff 
deployed in clinical and 
support roles in the NHS 
by the end of April 2020
Number of Department 
for Work & Pensions staff 
redeployed as part of the initial 
response to the pandemic
Percentage of chief fi nance 
offi cers from single tier and 
county councils who expect 
to make cuts in service 
budgets in 2021-22
Workforce pressures
Ensuring that existing systems can 
respond effectively and flexibly to 
emergencies, including provision 
for spare or additional capacity and 
redeploying staff where needed.
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45 Government took action to increase the 
workforce available and was able to redeploy 
staff in key areas:
• In the NHS, staff in non-patient-facing roles 
were asked to support clinical practice. By the 
end of April 2020, an extra 18,200 staff 
were deployed in clinical and support roles 
(Figure 7), including 10,100 students and 
8,050 returning retired and former healthcare 
professionals. Planned care in the NHS was 
reduced to provide capacity for COVID-19 
patients and non-COVID-19 demand for 
services was lower than usual levels. It is not 
yet known to what extent this will cause more 
patients to present, potentially with more acute 
problems, in future.
• A cross-government team involving 450 staff 
was set up to support the procurement 
of personal protective equipment by the 
Department of Health & Social Care.
• The Department for Work & Pensions 
redeployed around 10,000 staff at different 
points during its initial response, moving 
them from policy, back-office roles and other 
benefits and services into new claim handling 
roles, to maximise its jobcentre and service 
centre capacity.
46 Our good practice guide Improving operational 
delivery in government notes that government’s 
operational management capability has changed 
little over the past 10 years. Government has 
often operated in a firefighting mode, reacting in 
an unplanned way to problems as they arise and 
surviving from day to day. Our evidence suggests 
that a fundamental shift in capability, capacity 
and resilience may be needed to cope better with 
future emergency responses.
Figure 7
Additional staff deployed to support the NHS in 











1 Data for allied health professionals are as at 15 May 2020. 
Other data are as at 30 April 2020.
2 The fi gure excludes a small number of healthcare scientists, 
dentists and pharmacists who were redeployed.
Source: Comptroller and Auditor General, Readying the NHS and adult 
social care in England for COVID-19
Students
Retired and former staff
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47 By the end of March 2021, the government 
had committed an estimated £372 billion to its 
response to the pandemic. This represents a highly 
significant, unplanned increase in public spending. 
While a portion of this spending relates to short-term 
measures, some commitments and liabilities are likely 
to remain for the medium and long term, although 
there are significant uncertainties about their amount 
and timeframe. For example:
• it is uncertain if the COVID-19 vaccination 
programme will need to take place regularly, 
for example becoming an annual programme. 
This would have long-term implications for 
NHS England & NHS Improvement’s staffing 
and budgets; and
• some local authority finance directors expect 
the pandemic to have a medium-term to 
long-term impact on the sector’s finances. 
Rather than them simply returning to normal 
once the pandemic is over, it is likely that 
a programme of financial recovery will be 
required, with potential long-term implications 
for the Ministry of Housing, Communities & 
Local Goverment’s support for the sector.
These commitments may impact the longer-term 
sustainability of public finances. Sustainable public 
finances support economic stability, build fiscal 
resilience and increase government’s ability to act 
to support individuals and the economy when this 
is needed.
Long-term financial sustainability
Considering which COVID-19-related 
spending commitments are likely 
to be retained for the long term, 
and what these additional spending 
commitments mean for long-term 
financial sustainability.
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Appendix One
Our scope and evidence base
Scope
1 This report has been prepared to provide initial 
insights from our work to date on the government’s 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This report 
includes specific examples from our published work. 
These are illustrative examples and not indicative 
of the overall performance of specific departments. 
This report does not set out what action government 
has taken since these reports were published, or 
what actions government has taken or intends to 
take on the learning points set out in this report.
Evidence base
2 This report draws on the 17 National 
Audit Office (NAO) reports on government’s 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic published 
up to 19 May 2021, which are listed in Figure 8. 
The recommendations included in these reports 
are listed in Appendix Two. The report also draws 
on other work we have published that covered the 
COVID-19 pandemic, including our COVID-19 cost 
tracker, good practice guides on fraud and error 
and operational delivery, report on The adult social 
care market in England and Departmental Overview 
2019-20: Department for Work & Pensions.
3 The fieldwork underlying our evidence base was 
mostly carried out in 2020. No additional fieldwork 
was carried out for this report, except for providing 
up-to-date figures for the ministerial directions 
published in 2020 (see paragraph 11 and Figure 3). 
Other figures are based on previous NAO reports and 
have not been updated, even where more recent data 
may be available.
4 As of 1 May 2021, the Committee of Public 
Accounts had published 10 reports on government’s 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which are listed 
in Figure 9 on page 36. The Committee’s reports are 
not part of the evidence base of this report.
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Figure 8
National Audit Office reports on the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic
Report Website link
Overview of the UK government’s response to the COVID-19 
pandemic, Session 2019–2021, HC 366, May 2020.
www.nao.org.uk/report/summary-of-uk-governments-response-
to-the-covid-19-pandemic/ 
Readying the NHS and adult social care in England for 
COVID-19, Session 2019–2021, HC 367, June 2020.
www.nao.org.uk/report/readying-the-nhs-and-adult-social-care-
in-england-for-covid-19/ 
Guide for audit and risk committees on financial reporting 




Investigation into how government increased the number 
of ventilators available to the NHS in response to COVID-19, 
Session 2019–2021, HC 731, September 2020.
www.nao.org.uk/report/increasing-ventilator-capacity-in-
response-to-covid-19/ 
Investigation into the Bounce Back Loan Scheme,  
Session 2019–2021, HC 860, October 2020.
www.nao.org.uk/report/bounce-back-loan-scheme/ 
Implementing employment support schemes in response 




Investigation into government procurement during the COVID-19 
pandemic, Session 2019–2021, HC 959, November 2020.
www.nao.org.uk/report/government-procurement-during-the-
covid-19-pandemic/ 
The supply of personal protective equipment (PPE) during 




Investigation into the free school meals voucher scheme, 
Session 2019–2021, HC 1036, December 2020.
www.nao.org.uk/report/investigation-into-the-free-school-meals-
voucher-scheme/ 
The government’s approach to test and trace in England – 
interim report, Session 2019–2021, HC 1070, December 2020.
www.nao.org.uk/report/the-governments-approach-to-test-and-
trace-in-england-interim-report/
Investigation into preparations for potential COVID-19 vaccines, 
Session 2019–2021, HC 1071, December 2020.
www.nao.org.uk/report/investigation-into-preparations-for-
potential-covid-19-vaccines/ 
Investigation into the housing of rough sleepers during 




Protecting and supporting the clinically extremely vulnerable 
during lockdown, Session 2019–2021, HC 1131, February 2021.
www.nao.org.uk/report/protecting-and-supporting-the-
vulnerable-during-lockdown/ 
Local government finance in the pandemic, Session 2019–2021, 
HC 1240, March 2021.
www.nao.org.uk/report/local-government-finance-in-the-
pandemic/ 
Investigation into the Culture Recovery Fund,  
Session 2019–2021, HC 1241, March 2021.
www.nao.org.uk/report/investigation-into-the-culture-recovery-
fund/
Support for children’s education during the early stages of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, Session 2019–2021, HC 1243, March 2021.
www.nao.org.uk/report/support-for-childrens-education-during-
the-covid-19-pandemic/ 
Investigation into government funding to charities during the 




1 Other National Audit Office outputs have also covered COVID-19 themes, such as our COVID-19 cost tracker, good practice guidance on fraud and 
error and on operational delivery, our report on The adult social care market in England and our Departmental Overview 2019-20: 
Department for Work & Pensions. For references, see footnotes 2 to 4 on page 8.
Source: National Audit Office
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Figure 9
Committee of Public Accounts reports on the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic
Report Website link
Whole of Government Response to COVID-19, Thirteenth Report 
of Session 2019–2021, HC 404, July 2020.
https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/2024/
documents/22788/default/
Readying the NHS and social care for the COVID-19 peak, 
Fourteenth Report of Session 2019–2021, HC 405, July 2020.
https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/2179/
documents/20139/default/
Covid-19: Supply of ventilators, Twenty-Seventh Report of 
Session 2019–2021, HC 685, November 2020.
https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/3639/
documents/35370/default/
Covid-19: Bounce Back Loan Scheme, Thirty-Third Report of 
Session 2019–2021, HC 687, December 2020.
https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/3988/
documents/40040/default/
Covid-19: Support for jobs, Thirty-Fourth Report of Session 
2019–2021, HC 920, December 2020.
https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/4040/
documents/44411/default/
COVID-19: the free school meals voucher scheme, Forty-First 
Report of Session 2019–2021, HC 689, February 2021.
https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/4569/
documents/46230/default/
COVID-19: Government procurement and supply of 
Personal Protective Equipment, Forty-Second Report of 
Session 2019–2021, HC 928, February 2021.
https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/4607/
documents/46709/default/
COVID-19: Planning for a vaccine Part 1, Forty-Third Report of 
Session 2019–2021, HC 930, February 2021.
https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/4653/
documents/46945/default/
COVID-19: Test, track and trace (part 1), Forty-Seventh Report 
of Session 2019–2021, HC 932, March 2021.
https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/4976/
documents/50058/default/
COVID-19: Housing people sleeping rough, Forty-Ninth Report 
of Session 2019–2021, HC 934, March 2021.
https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/5109/
documents/50451/default/
Source: Committee of Public Accounts
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Appendix Two
Recommendations made 
by the National Audit 
Office in its reports on the 
government’s response to 
the COVID-19 pandemic
Implementing employment support schemes 
in response to the COVID-19 pandemic
1 To learn from their experience in implementing 
the employment support schemes, and to protect 
taxpayer interests HM Treasury and HM Revenue & 
Customs should: 
a consider how to ensure that reliable data 
covering as many people as possible can 
be used to determine eligibility so that fewer 
people suffering loss of income are excluded 
from future similar schemes; 
b monitor how far employment support schemes 
protect jobs, recognising that the approach 
may need to adapt rapidly in response to how 
the pandemic evolves over the coming months;
c increase the emphasis on using preventative 
controls for tackling fraud and error in the 
new schemes. Where appropriate for future 
schemes, carry out more direct work with 
employees to ensure employers treat them 
according to scheme rules, and increase 
visibility of which employers use employment 
support schemes; 
d more quickly assess the total value of error 
and fraud; and explore the feasibility of 
commencing assessment activity earlier 
for future schemes so that some testing is 
undertaken while schemes are live; 
e review whether a faster programme of 
recruitment and training can be provided for 
grant compliance staff, recognising that the 
activity may differ to tax compliance work; and 
f review how to organise HM Revenue & 
Customs’ compliance response to ensure that 
sufficient resources are committed to recover 
overpayments and fraudulent payments on 
both schemes where it is cost-effective to 
do so.
Investigation into government procurement 
during the COVID-19 pandemic
2 Our recommendations aim to ensure 
that, should the widespread need to procure 
goods with extreme urgency happen again, the 
associated risks to public money and propriety are 
managed effectively.
a Awarding bodies should publish basic 
information on contracts in a reasonable time, 
in line with guidance to publish within 90 days 
of award. Transparency is one of the key 
controls to mitigate the risks associated with 
emergency direct awards. Therefore, during 
these types of situation, it is critical that basic 
information on contract awards is published as 
soon as possible.
38 Appendix Two Initial learning from the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic
b The Cabinet Office should issue further 
guidance on specific procurement risks 
arising from greater use of regulation 32(2)
(c). The guidance should build on the lessons 
government has learned from the use of this 
regulation during the pandemic to date and in 
particular cover the levels of transparency and 
documentation required for key decisions, such 
as choice of procurement route. The Cabinet 
Office should continue to monitor the use of 
regulation 32(2)(c), as part of the decisions 
that it considers through the Cabinet Office 
controls process, to ensure any continued 
use is fully justified, and review the operation 
of procurement rules to encourage greater 
use of competitive procedures in extremely 
urgent procurements.
c Awarding bodies should provide clear 
documentation for establishing and using 
procedures that may result in unequal 
treatment of suppliers. While segmenting 
suppliers based on strength of evidence 
to deliver can be beneficial in speeding 
up the procurement process, awarding 
bodies need to ensure that the criteria for 
segmenting suppliers is documented, applied 
consistently and records of each evaluation 
of supplier’s suitability are kept to support 
procurement decisions and avoid perceptions 
of unfair treatment.
d When procuring directly from suppliers, 
awarding bodies need to provide clear 
documentation on how they have considered 
and managed potential conflicts of interest 
or bias in the procurement process. Before 
awarding contracts, awarding bodies should 
document due diligence checks carried out 
on suppliers and associated parties. Steps 
to manage actual and perceived conflicts 
of interest, for example those set out in the 
Ministerial Code and Civil Service Management 
Code, or other actions taken by awarding 
bodies should be properly documented.
e The Cabinet Office should review whether 
requirements for disclosure and management of 
relevant interests are sufficient in cases where 
public office-holders hold cross-government 
responsibilities for awarding contracts or 
procurement. For such cases, the Cabinet 
Office should take steps to enable departments 
and other government bodies to identify any 
potential conflicts of interest by strengthening 
existing measures in place.
The supply of personal protective equipment 
(PPE) during the COVID-19 pandemic8 
3 Given the human and financial investment 
required in a response such as this and the 
continuing risk of further outbreaks, it is essential 
that lessons are identified, learned and acted on 
as swiftly as possible. We recently reported on the 
commercial aspects of certain PPE contracts, and 
made recommendations for improving procurement. 
In taking forward its new PPE strategy, the 
Department of Health & Social Care will need to 
identify lessons that can be learned. Specifically: 
a The Department of Health & Social Care and 
its partners had to oversee and take many 
unplanned and unprecedented actions to 
obtain PPE during the emergency. Inevitably, 
some actions were more successful than 
others. A comprehensive lessons-learned 
exercise involving all the main stakeholders, 
including local government and representatives 
of the workforce and suppliers, would inform 
the planning for future emergencies. This 
should include: consideration of whether any 
issues with PPE provision or use might have  
contributed to COVID-19 infections or deaths; 
how to determine the priorities when there 
are shortages of essential equipment such as 
PPE; and how events are recorded during an 
emergency response to help learn lessons for 
the future.
8  These are lessons to be learned rather than recommendations.
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b Business-as-usual activities within government 
need to strike the appropriate balance between 
operational and financial efficiency versus the 
longer-term need for resilience and capability 
for dealing with shocks. For PPE, this includes 
consideration of the cost implications of, 
and incentives needed for, developing and 
maintaining a domestic manufacturing base and 
increasing diversity in international supply. 
c Emergency plans for dealing with a pandemic 
must provide for appropriate stockpiles of 
high-quality PPE together with comprehensive 
and resilient arrangements for the rapid 
procurement and distribution of PPE, based 
on reliable information. Plans need to include 
distribution of PPE to social care and all parts 
of the health system. Organisations responsible 
for maintaining and testing their plans must 
actively monitor for new threats that might 
overwhelm their plans.
d Effective governance, lines of accountability, 
and resourcing responsibilities are important 
for an effective rapid-response in an emergency 
situation. Developing these arrangements, and 
ensuring that they remain up to date, should 
be part of the emergency plan for activation 
when required.
e Clear, timely, two-way information and 
communication are vital for both providing 
services at the front-line and for managing 
the response at the national level. This 
includes information on national and local 
PPE stocks and requirements, and feedback 
loops. Deficiencies in information on, and 
communication about, PPE can lead to a 
breakdown of trust, failure to take effective 
action, and poor value for money.
f Despite efforts to integrate them over the 
years, health and social care have continued 
to be separate systems. During this crisis the 
social care sector was hit hard by shortages 
of PPE, and government needs to understand 
why national bodies provided more support to 
hospitals than to social care and how to prevent 
that happening again.
The government’s approach to test and trace 
in England – interim report
4 NHS Test & Trace should:
a explore how to make fuller use of its theoretical 
maximum testing capacity each day, so that 
existing infrastructure and resources are 
efficiently employed and more of those infected 
with COVID-19 can be identified and their 
contacts traced;
b plan against a range of plausible outcomes 
to ensure it has flexibility to respond to 
predictable and unexpected spikes in testing 
demand. Problems emerged when schools and 
universities reopened in September, despite 
a predictable spike in demand. NHS Test & 
Trace also needs to have contingency plans 
in place so it can respond to unexpected 
spikes in community testing, in order to 
provide an effective service, maintain public 
confidence, and ensure availability of testing 
for hospital patients;
c set out a clear strategy for how national and 
local tracing teams will work together, informed 
by a good understanding of local authority 
capacity and performance. The number of local 
authority-run schemes is set to increase, and 
NHS Test & Trace needs to be clear about how 
national and local services align, and who is 
best placed to carry out activities. It also needs 
to understand what local authority capacity and 
funding are required to deliver its objectives;
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d model and communicate as early as possible 
how changes in testing policy are likely to 
affect the workload of national and local tracing 
services. Such changes could include increased 
testing of certain categories of key worker 
and the introduction of mass testing (formerly 
referred to as Operation Moonshot);
e take steps to increase public engagement and 
compliance with self-isolation. NHS Test & 
Trace is one of a number of bodies, alongside 
local authorities and the police, who can 
influence compliance. It must work closely 
with these bodies, drawing on the best public 
health and behavioural expertise to identify 
how its actions can best contribute. For as long 
as compliance is low, the cost-effectiveness of 
NHS Test & Trace’s activities will inevitably be 
in doubt;
f take account to the maximum extent possible 
of value for money and normal commercial 
good practice as it procures new infrastructure 
and services. In particular, it needs to have 
sufficient flexibility in future contracts to 
allow government and contractors to respond 
effectively to changing requirements at 
reasonable cost; and
g embed strong and sustainable management 
structures, controls and lines of accountability. 
We have noticed arrangements where 
accountability does not clearly align with 
organisational and strategic objectives in 
other aspects of the government’s COVID-19 
response. With the creation of the National 
Institute for Health Protection, there is an 
opportunity to clarify arrangements.
Investigation into the housing of rough 
sleepers during the COVID-19 pandemic
5 Everyone In has also raised key issues 
that the government needs to address in the 
immediate future:
a Everyone In has for the first time provided 
data on the potential scale of the population 
in England which either sleeps rough or is 
at risk of doing so. The Ministry of Housing, 
Communities & Local Government needs to 
build upon this knowledge to understand fully 
the size and needs of this population and 
communicate this to local authorities.
b Everyone In has resulted in a large number of 
people remaining in emergency accommodation 
and not being able to move on from it because 
they have no recourse to public funds. The 
government needs to establish what action it 
will take with this population.
c The response to the resurgence of COVID-19 
does not appear as comprehensive as the 
initial Everyone In in the spring. The Ministry 
of Housing, Communities & Local Government 
will need to keep under close review whether its 
more targeted approach will protect vulnerable 
individuals as decisively as the approach it took 
in the early stages of the pandemic.
d It is clear that there is significant learning 
available from the experience of Everyone In 
for the Ministry of Housing, Communities & 
Local Government and all partners involved. 
The Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local 
Government should use this knowledge towards 
its goal of ending rough sleeping by the end of 
this Parliament, when it returns to its review of 
rough sleeping. Also, as the Department revisits 
its rough sleeping strategy, and to support its 
new objective for this, it should seek to align 
the initiatives and funding streams announced 
during COVID-19 into a cohesive plan.
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Protecting and supporting the clinically 
extremely vulnerable during lockdown
6 To improve support to clinically extremely 
vulnerable (CEV) people when advised to shield in 
the future, we recommend that:
a the Department of Health & Social Care should 
ensure that healthcare data systems allow easy, 
but secure, access to healthcare data;
b NHS England & NHS Improvement and NHS 
Digital should set out how they will improve 
the accuracy of patient telephone numbers 
to improve the speed of communication 
with patients;
c the Department of Health & Social Care 
should set out the core data requirements it 
is likely to need in a future pandemic or civil 
emergency and how it can access these data 
in a timely manner;
d the Department of Health & Social Care should 
establish a robust plan on how to communicate 
clearly, quickly and consistently with CEV 
people to ensure that people are clear if they 
need to shield, why they need to shield, how to 
shield and the support available to them;
e by April 2021, the Ministry of Housing, 
Communities & Local Government should 
review the effectiveness of the new National 
Shielding Service System, introduced for the 
second lockdown, to ensure that it provides 
intended benefits;
f the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local 
Government should set out how it can establish 
the capacity and capability of local authorities 
to support shielding-type exercises in a timely 
way in the event of future pandemics or civil 
emergencies and how it can engage more 
effectively with local authorities; and
g for future pandemic planning, government 
should consider how it will approach balancing 
the relative merits of central, universal offers of 
support against targeted local support.
Support for children’s education during the 
early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic
7 We recommend that the Department for 
Education should:
a conduct a full evaluation of its response to 
the COVID-19 pandemic, covering both the 
early stages and the more recent disruption to 
schooling, including seeking input from schools 
and other stakeholders;
b put in place effective monitoring to track the 
longer-term impact of COVID-19 disruption 
on all pupils’ development and attainment, 
with a particular focus on vulnerable and 
disadvantaged children, and take action in light 
of the results;
c work with Ofsted to reintroduce arrangements 
for obtaining independent assurance about 
schools’ provision, while recognising the 
additional pressures that schools are under 
during the pandemic;
d act quickly on its early assessments of the 
catch-up programme during 2020/21, to 
ensure that the funding is achieving value for 
money and the National Tutoring Programme 
schemes are reaching disadvantaged children 
as intended; and
e identify lessons for remote and online learning 
from innovative practice developed during 
the pandemic and take account of these 





This report has been printed on Pro Digital 
Silk and contains material sourced from 
responsibly managed and sustainable 
forests certified in accordance with the 
FSC (Forest Stewardship Council).
The wood pulp is totally recyclable and 
acid-free. Our printers also have full ISO 14001 
environmental accreditation, which ensures 
that they have effective procedures in place to 
manage waste and practices that may affect 
the environment.




Design and Production by NAO External Relations 
DP Ref: 010746-001
